Experimental philosophy of actual and counterfactual free will intuitions
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-2015
Department
Department of Cognitive and Learning Sciences
Abstract
Five experiments suggested that everyday free will and moral responsibility judgments about some hypothetical thought examples differed from free will and moral responsibility judgments about the actual world. Experiment 1 (N=106) showed that free will intuitions about the actual world measured by the FAD-Plus poorly predicted free will intuitions about a hypothetical person performing a determined action (r=.13). Experiments 2-5 replicated this result and found the relations between actual free will judgments and free will judgments about hypothetical determined or fated actions (rs=.22-.35) were much smaller than the differences between them (ηp2=.2-.55). These results put some pressure on theoretical accounts of everyday intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility.
Publication Title
Consciousness and Cognition
Recommended Citation
Feltz, A.
(2015).
Experimental philosophy of actual and counterfactual free will intuitions.
Consciousness and Cognition,
36, 113-130.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.06.001
Retrieved from: https://digitalcommons.mtu.edu/michigantech-p/6244