Measuring Systemic Risk of Switching Attacks Based on Cybersecurity Technologies in Substations
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-1-2020
Department
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering; Department of Mathematical Sciences
Abstract
This paper describes the derivation of steady-state probabilities of the power communication infrastructure based on today's cybersecurity technologies. The elaboration of steady-state probabilities is established on (i) modified models developed such as password models, (ii) new models on digital relays representing the authentication mechanism, and (iii) models for honeypots/honeynet within a substation network. A generalized stochastic Petri net (GSPN) is utilized to formulate the detailed statuses and transitions of components embedded in a cyber-net. Comprehensive steady-state probabilities are quantitatively and qualitatively performed. The methodologies on how transition probabilities and rates are extracted from the network components and a conclusion of actuarial applications is discussed.
Publication Title
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
Recommended Citation
Yamashita, K.,
Ten, C.,
Rho, Y.,
Wang, L.,
Wei, W.,
&
Ginter, A.
(2020).
Measuring Systemic Risk of Switching Attacks Based on Cybersecurity Technologies in Substations.
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
35(6), 4206-4219.
http://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2020.2986452
Retrieved from: https://digitalcommons.mtu.edu/michigantech-p/14361
Publisher's Statement
© 1969-2012 IEEE. Publisher’s version of record: https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2020.2986452