A theory of integrating tamper evidence with stabilization
© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2015. We propose the notion of tamper-evident stabilization -that combines stabilization with the concept of tamper evidence- for computing systems. On the first glance, these notions are contradictory; stabilization requires that eventually the system functionality is fully restored whereas tamper evidence requires that the system functionality is permanently degraded in the event of tampering. Tamper-evident stabilization captures the intuition that the system will tolerate perturbation upto a limit. In the event that it is perturbed beyond that limit, it will exhibit permanent evidence of tampering, where it may provide reduced (possibly none) functionality. We compare tamper-evident stabilization with (conventional) stabilization and with active stabilization and propose an approach to verify tamper-evident stabilizing programs in polynomial time. We demonstrate tamper-evident stabilization with two examples and argue how approaches for designing stabilization can be used to design tamper-evident stabilization. We also study issues of composition in tamper-evident stabilization. Finally, we point out how tamper-evident stabilization can effectively be used to provide tradeoff between fault-prevention and fault tolerance.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
A theory of integrating tamper evidence with stabilization.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics),
Retrieved from: https://digitalcommons.mtu.edu/michigantech-p/4090